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"Liberty Finds No Refuge in a Jurisprudenceof Doubt"'

I. INTRODUCTION

In Lawrence v.

Texas,2

the conflicts between Justice Kennedy's

majority opinion'-invalidating a state statute prohibiting sodomy between
consenting adults-and Justice Scalia's dissent 4 -attacking

the very

foundation upon which the majority's reasoning was
predicated-underscore the widely divergent methods of constitutional
interpretation that both Justices embrace in "values based" adjudication.'
In holding that the "liberty" interest 6 embodied in the U.S. Constitution
protects the right of two consenting adults to engage in sodomy, Justice

Kennedy's reasoning arguably reflected a "progressive," "dynamic," or
"evolving" approach to constitutional interpretation, which views the
Constitution as a "living" document whose meaning is based upon an
"emerging

awareness 7"'

of

contemporary

customs,

norms

and

1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3. See id. at 561.
4. See id. at 586 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
5. For purposes of clarity, the term "values based" adjudication refers to those cases in
which the asserted constitutional right conflicts with or implicates matters that state legislatures
have either circumscribed or prohibited based upon, inter alia, notions of conventional morality.
By "conventional morality," the author implies that at least a portion of the reasoning underlying
a legislature's policy predilections relates to notions of what is "right" or "wrong" in a religious or
ethical context. These divisive cases often involve considerations regarding the moral basis of
individual and collective conduct. Other cases, for example, that fall within the purview of this
delineation are Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
and Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
6. The "liberty" interest referred to in this Article arises under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
7. Id. at 572.
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perspectives.8 Justice Kennedy's dynamic approach to "values based"
constitutional decision-making is best underscored by the fact that, in
striving to divine an emerging awareness9 to inform his view of the
Constitution's liberty interest,'l Justice Kennedy relied upon certain
foreign sources of law, specifically from the European Court of Human
Rights, 1 to support the Lawrence majority's holding. 2
Conversely, Justice Scalia's scathing dissent in Lawrence reflects his
traditional adherence to an "originalist"' 3 philosophy of constitutional
decision-making, which advances the proposition that fundamental
constitutional rights exist only to the extent that such rights are "deeply
rooted" in U.S. culture, history, and tradition. 4 Thus, in the context of
values based adjudication, Justice Scalia's framework is to inquire whether
and to what extent the asserted fundamental right has traditionally
engendered support, protection, or recognition in the United States'
historical cultural practice." Such inquiry arguably involves an
examination of both the founders' intent when drafting a particular
constitutional provision and the early understandings of particular rights
that were deemed fundamental or worthy of heightened constitutional
protection. Under this view of values based adjudication, the notion of an
"emerging" or "evolving" awareness of fundamental rights, whether from
8. This Article is narrowly confined to examining Justice Kennedy's "progressive" approach
in the Lawrence decision, and to analyzing the implications of such methodology in "values based"
cases that are likely to arise before the U.S. Supreme Court.
9. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
10. See supra note 6.
11. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
12. The utilization of foreign sources of law, to inform or otherwise support domestic
constitutional decisions, is reflected in the relatively recent theory of "comparative
constitutionalism," which examines the prudence of relying upon or referring to such sources in the
domestic constitutional context. This Article is confined to both discussing Justice Kennedy's use
of foreign law in crafting the Lawrence opinion and whether the use of foreign law is workable and
pragmatic in the context of domestic, "values based" decisionmaking. For a more complete
discussion of "comparative constitutionalism," see, e.g., Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Permeability
of ConstitutionalBorders, 82 TEx. L. REv. 1763 (2003).
13. The "originalist" approach to constitutional interpretation exists in many forms and is
applicable to many contexts. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OFAMERICA 144 (1990). The
purpose of this Article is to examine Justice Scalia's use of"originalism" in the Lawrence decision
and to assess the workability of this approach in future cases likely to arise before the U.S. Supreme
Court.
14. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
15. Id. at 593 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (holding that fundamental
liberty interests must be "'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental."')) (internal citations omitted).
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foreign or domestic sources, would be largely irrelevant to the question of
whether an asserted right warrants constitutional protection. 6
This Article endeavors to bridge the divide between Justice Kennedy's
"progressive" approach and Justice Scalia's "originalist" approach, by
introducing the concept of "reverse" or negative originalism. As a
threshold matter, "reverse originalism" recognizes that both Justice
Kennedy's progressivism and Justice Scalia's originalism contain valuable
aspects that should remain relevant to values based constitutional
adjudication. For example, "reverse originalism" proposes, in accordance
with Justice Kennedy's approach, that evolving or contemporary
perspectives of fairness and due process should inform the search for a
disposition in values based adjudication that is most consonant with basic
notions of liberty. Indeed, the collective conscience of individuals, groups
and institutions, over time, both domestic and international, can provide
important insights into the very meaning of liberty that lies at the core of
the U.S. constitutional framework.
Importantly, however, progressivism is not without its limitations and,
if applied exclusively, would threaten to undermine years of Supreme
Court jurisprudence by eviscerating the stare decisis doctrine, 7 risk
uncertainty and unpredictability for future litigants, unduly compromise
the core majoritarian premise of our democratic system, and potentially
invest in judges a legislative or policymaking power that transgresses the
boundaries of proper judicial review. Consequently, a significant check
upon the limitations of progressivism lies in the aspect of originalism
which reflects the principle that American historical traditions, customs,
and practices should maintain an important role in determining the values
that we believe are worthy of domestic constitutional protection. As such,
the Constitution's text, the very meaning of liberty that emanates from its
provisions, and the country's deeply-rooted cultural understandings
regarding the concept of liberty, must all continue to inform current
perspectives concerning those values that the United States will deem
fundamental.
16. Importantly, for purposes of this Article, the notion that Justice Scalia would largely
eschew reliance upon an "emerging" or "evolving" awareness of newly-asserted rights is limited
to the context of "values based" adjudication. Indeed, in the area of Eighth Amendment (Cruel and
Unusual Punishment)jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court, including Justice Scalia, has endorsed
a method that examines whether "evolving standards of decency" counsel in favor of determining
that a specific practice is cruel or unusual. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61 (2005).
17. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587-88 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that the
doctrine of stare decicis supports the overruling of prior Supreme Court decisions only where: "(1)
its foundations have been eroded ... ; (2) it has been subject to 'substantial and continuing
criticism'; and (3) it has not induced 'individual or societal reliance' counsels against
overturning.").
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As with progressivism, however, the application of originalism is not
without its limitations. Most significantly, the exclusive application of
"originalism" is likely to result in constitutional decisions that
contemporary perspectives would deem unfair and unjust.'" Such criticism
is not without merit; while concepts of liberty necessarily involve
reference to deeply-rooted historical practice and custom, such
conceptions do not remain inert or immutable but are instead receptive to
the evolution in human thought that Justice Kennedy's progressivism
embraces. Herein lies the problem, namely, what method can best
recognize the emerging awareness that Justice Kennedy relies upon in
Lawrence, yet remain faithful to the text, history, and historical traditions
that originalism strives to maintain?
This Article proposes that "negative originalism" can bridge this divide
and effectuate the objectives of Justice Kennedy's progressivism and
Justice Scalia's "originalism," by re-framing the relevant constitutional
inquiry in "values based" adjudication. Specifically, instead of asking
precisely what the framers intended when drafting a particular
constitutional provision, the relevant inquiry should assess whether the
recognition of a new fundamental right in our constitutional regime would
offend, affront, or otherwise be incongruous with the broad purposes
underlying both the Constitution's provisions and the rich historical U.S.
tradition. As detailed in this Article, this approach will allow the U.S.
Supreme Court to consider contemporary perspectives regarding
fundamental fairness, liberty, and equality at the national and the
international level, when deciding whether newly asserted rights or values
warrant constitutional protection.
Furthermore, "negative originalism" will require the Court to lend
significant weight to the intentions, purposes, and objectives that informed
both the Constitution's drafting and the nation's early understandings of
liberty. However, instead of advocating that the Court endeavor to divine
the precise meaning that the Constitution's drafters specifically intended
for a given constitutional provision, "negative originalism" proposes that
the Court develop an understanding of the broader conception of fairness,
liberty, and equality that inspired the Constitution's substantive provisions.
"Negative originalism" therefore ensures that our country's rich history
and traditions remain relevant to values based cases while recognizing that
contemporaryperspectives concerning fairness and equality, both domestic
and foreign, can be useful in fashioning solutions to problems that the
Constitution's drafters never could have envisioned.
18. See generally Cass Sunstein, RADICALS INROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS
ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005) (arguing that originalism would lead to unjust results in many
cases).
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Part IIbriefly discusses the Lawrence decision, specifically referencing
the differing approaches utilized by Justices Kennedy and Scalia in
reaching their conclusions. Part ER examines a critical component of
Justice Kennedy's progressivism, particularly that aspect which relied
upon foreign law to support the Lawrence holding. Part HI concludes that,
while foreign sources of law should bear relevance to values based
adjudication, courts should exercise substantial circumspection when
relying upon them due to the cultural, political, social, and institutional
nuances that underlie such laws. Part IV introduces "negative originalism"
and argues that this tool will most effectively permit the Supreme Court
to adopt a dynamic approach to constitutional interpretation.
II. LA WRENCE V. TExAS: HIGHLIGHTING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN JUSTICE
KENNEDY'S "PROGRESSIVISM" AND JUSTICE SCALIA'S "ORIGINALISM"

In Lawrence, the Court was confronted with the question of whether a
state statute criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults
impermissibly violated the privacy, equal protection, and liberty interests
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. 9 This issue was not without precedent, as the Court
previously ruled in Bowers v. Hardwick" that a Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults did not violate these
fundamental guarantees."'
Thus, Lawrence presented the Court with an opportunity to revisit the
Bowers holding and reasoning. In so doing, the Court, per Justice
Kennedy, overruled Bowers and proceeded to recognize consensual
sodomy as a protected right pursuant to the Constitution's liberty interest.22
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion not only signaled a sharp departure
from Bowers, particularly through its expansive view ofthe Constitution's

19. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-63.
20. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
21. See id. at 191-96. Arguably, the facts in Bowers differ from Lawrence to the extent that
the Georgia statute in Bowers criminalized consensual sodomy regardless of whether the
participants were of the same sex, whereas the Texas statute in Lawrence was directed exclusively
at same-sex participants. Notwithstanding, the reasoning upon which Bowers rested and which
Lawrence subsequently rejected involves a view of the Constitution's liberty interest that is largely
unaffected by this distinction.
22. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78. It can be argued, however, that the Court did not hold
that consensual sodomy was a fundamental right per se, but rather that matters of sexual intimacy,
on a broader level, enjoy fundamental rights protection, under which consensual sodomy
derivatively enjoys protection. Id.
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liberty interest, but also underscored the progressivism that increasingly
defines his jurisprudence in values based adjudication.23
A. Justice Kennedy's Progressivismin Lawrence
At the outset, it is important to recognize that Justice Kennedy's
majority decision was not premised solely upon a progressive or evolving
view of the Constitution's liberty interest. For example, Justice Kennedy
disagreed with Justice Scalia's view that homosexual sodomy has been
widely circumscribed as a matter of historical tradition and practice.24 In
addition, Justice Kennedy relied upon what he termed "broad statements
of the substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause" as
reflected in the Court's earlier jurisprudence.25
Justice Kennedy's progressivism played a crucial role in his conclusion
that Bowers's foundation had been eroded by subsequent jurisprudence
and that homosexual sodomy now fell within the purview of the
Constitution's liberty interest." First, Justice Kennedy's analysis focused
upon the historical roots and practices pertaining to consensual sodomy;
he disputed the extent to which laws were targeted at such conduct. 27 He
stated, "we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are
of most relevance here. 28 Indeed, Justice Kennedy utilized this framework
in Lawrence to highlight a "progressive" or "evolving" method of
constitutional interpretation:

23. Id.at 567-78.
24. Id. at 568 (stating that "there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed
at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter."). In fact, Justice Kennedy went so far as to state that
"the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion...
indicate[s]. [The] historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated").
Id. at 571.
25. Id. at 565. Justice Kennedy relied, for example, upon dicta from Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), for his view that certain conduct enjoys real and substantial protection as an "exercise of
liberty under the Due Process Clause .. ").
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
26. A critical aspect of Justice Kennedy's view that Bowers's foundation was eroded by
subsequent jurisprudence is reflected by his statement that Bowers "fail[ed] to appreciate the extent
of the liberty at stake" and "misapprehended the claim of liberty there presented." Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 567. In fact, Justice Kennedy's classification of the Lawrence "liberty" interest arguably
reflected the broadersentiment that circumstances involving "private human conduct" and "sexual
behavior" warrant protection under the Constitution's liberty interest. Id. The right to engage in
consensual sodomy, therefore, falls within these broader liberty interests. Id.
27. See id.
at 568-72.
28. Id.at 571-72.
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These references [recent precedent] show an emerging awareness
that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.
"History and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry." . . . This
emerging recognition should have been apparent when Bowers was
decided. 9
Moreover, Justice Kennedy's search for an "emerging awareness" led him
to focus not primarily upon historical culture, practice, or tradition, but
instead upon the modem Model Penal Code's recommendation that private
sexual conduct not be penalized.3 ° Additionally, he examined several
states' failure to enforce anti-sodomy laws, for the proposition that
homosexual
conduct was includable within the Constitution's liberty
3
interest. '
Of far more import, however, was the portion of Justice Kennedy's
emerging awareness analysis relying upon foreign sources of law to
support the Lawrence holding, such as the British Parliament's 1957
recommendation that homosexual conduct not be punished.32 Most
importantly, however, and the focal point of this Article is Justice
Kennedy's substantial reliance upon decisional law from the European
Court of Human Rights, which supported his expansive view of the
Constitution's liberty interest:
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was
decided the European Court of Human Rights considered a case
with parallels to Bowers and to today's case. An adult male resident
in Northern Ireland alleged he was a practicing homosexual who
desired to engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The laws of
Northern Ireland forbade him that right .... The court held that the
laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European
Convention on Human Rights. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45
Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981) Par. 52. Authoritative in all countries that are
members of the Council of Europe... the decision is at odds with
the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial
in our Western civilization.33
29. Id. at 572 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
30. Id. at 572-74.
31. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-74.
32. Id. at 572-73.
33. Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
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Thus, in addition to relying upon domestic developments both prior and
subsequent to Bowers,34 Justice Kennedy ushered in a new jurisprudence
that utilized foreign sources of law to inform his progressive jurisprudence
and, ultimately, domestic constitutional decision-making:
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in
Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court of
Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision in
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom. See P. G. & J.H.v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 00044787/98, Par. 56 (Eur.Ct.H. R. Sept. 25, 2001) ....
Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation
of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate,
consensual conduct.... The right the petitioners seek in this case
has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many
other countries. There has been no showing that in this country the
governmental interest in circumscribing
personal choice is
35
somehow more legitimate or urgent.
Ultimately, therefore, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lawrence
underscores his commitment to a progressive approach to constitutional
interpretation in values based adjudication as well as a commitment to
using foreign sources of law as a method by which to divine the "emerging
awareness" 36 that characterizes such jurisprudence. Justice Kennedy's use
of foreign sources of law as an important aspect of his progressive
jurisprudence will be analyzed in Part 1I.
B. Justice Scalia 's "Originalism" in Lawrence
In stark contrast to Justice Kennedy's progressivism was Justice
Scalia's dissent, which reaffirmed his commitment to an originalist
method of constitutional interpretation in values based adjudication.37
Reflecting his commitment to interpreting the Constitution solely in
accordance with historical perspectives, Justice Scalia went so far as to
declare in Lawrence that "there is no right to 'liberty' under the Due
34. See id. at 572-74, 576.
35. Id. at 576-77 (emphasis added).
36. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
37. As stated supra note 13, there exist many variations of the "originalist" philosophy that
are advocated by scholars, commentators, and judges. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
address the myriad components of originalism, and the various contexts to which it is applied.
Rather, this Article strives to analyze Justice Scalia's use of originalism in Lawrence, and as a
method of constitutional interpretation in values based adjudication.
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Process Clause, though today's opinion repeatedly makes that claim. 38
Indeed, Justice Scalia believes that the Due Process Clause grants
proceduralrather than substantive protection, leading to his statement in
Lawrence that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment expressly allows States to
deprive their citizens of 'liberty,' so long as 'due process of law' is
provided.... .""
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia's threshold assumption that the Due
Process Clause protects procedural, rather than substantive rights, reflects
an originalist perspective that could not be more at odds with Justice
Kennedy's progressivism. To the extent that Justice Scalia is willing to
recognize the existence of substantive rights under the Due Process
Clause, he was careful to note in Lawrence that "[w]e have held repeatedly
...that only fundamental rights qualify for this so-called 'heightened
scrutiny' protection-that is, rights which are 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition.'" 40 Thus, for Justice Scalia, a right qualifies
as fundamental under the Due Process Clause only if it is "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people" and is "an interest traditionally
protected by our society.""'
Accordingly, apart from "those privileges long recognizedat common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," ' 2 "[a]ll
other liberty interests may be abridged or abrogated pursuant to a validly
enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a legitimate state
' Applying this framework, Justice Scalia relied upon the
interest."43
traditions, customs and practices of the fifty states to arrive at the
"definitive [historical] conclusio[n] '" that "our Nation has a longstanding
history of laws prohibiting sodomy in general-regardless of whether it
was performed by same sex or opposite sex couples."4' 5 On this basis alone,
Justice Scalia would have found that a contemporary law prohibiting
consensual sodomy was well within a state's constitutional prerogative.

38. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 592 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 593 (emphasis added) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997)). Justice Scalia also noted that a "fundamental liberty interest" must also be "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" so that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed."
Washington, 521 U.S. at 721 (alteration in original) (quoting Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325,
326 (1937)).
41. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989)).
42. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 596 (alterations in original) (quoting majority opinion, id. at 568).
45. Id.
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More fundamentally, Justice Scalia's originalism entirely rejects the
emerging awareness analysis that characterizes Justice Kennedy's
progressivism and, in particular, the use of foreign sources of law to divine
evolving notions of liberty. As he noted in Lawrence, "an 'emerging
awareness' is by definition not 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition[s],' as we have said 'fundamental right' status requires." '46 In
Justice Scalia's view, therefore, "[c]onstitutional entitlements do not
spring into existence because some States choose to lessen or eliminate
criminal sanctions on certain behavior."4' 7 Perhaps most importantly,
Justice Scalia rejects the use of foreign sources of law because they should
have no place whatsoever in the Court's domestic values based
constitutional analysis:
Much less do [fundamental rights] spring into existence... because
foreign nations decriminalize conduct. The Bowers majority
opinion never relied on "values we share with a wider civilization"
...but rather rejected the claimed right to sodomy on the ground
that such a right was not "deeply rooted in this Nation'shistory and
tradition"... Bowers... holding is likewise devoid of any reliance
on the views of a "wider civilization" ....The Court's discussion
of these foreign views (ignoring, of course, the many countries that
have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy) is therefore
meaningless dicta.48
Such reliance, moreover, is particularly deleterious because in Justice
Scalia's view the Court should not impose fluid foreign culture upon
Americans. This statement reflects a core originalist criticism that Justice
Scalia espouses regarding "progressivism," that "traditional democratic
action ... should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new
'constitutional right' by a Court that is impatient of democratic change."4' 9
Ultimately, the differences in approach advocated by Justices Kennedy
and Scalia raise the fundamental question of whether progressivism or
originalism represents the best method by which to adjudicate values based
disputes. The answer to this question first requires a brief analysis of each
theory's benefits and limitations, after which this Article introduces the
concept of "reverse originalism."

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 598 (citations omitted).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598.
Id. (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986)).
Id. at 603.
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Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN "VALUES BASED"
ADJUDICATION: JUSTICE KENNEDY'S "PROGRESSIVISM" OR JUSTICE
SCALIA'S "ORIGINALISM"?

The Lawrence decision underscores the significant divide between
Justice Kennedy's and Justice Scalia's constitutional methodology in
values based adjudication by raising the critical question of whether
progressivism or originalism represents the more efficacious method for
deciding the fundamental constitutional questions that such adjudication
presents. As a threshold matter, this Article presupposes that the preferable
approach is one that leads to results that are consonant with contemporary
notions of fairness and equality while remaining faithful to the traditions
and practices upon which our constitutional jurisprudence is predicated.
Importantly, a brief examination of both approaches, including their
benefits and limitations, reveals that a combination of these interpretive
methods would most effectively yield a values based jurisprudence that
responds to contemporary perspectives while respecting our Nation's
historical underpinnings. Such a combination, termed "reverse" or
"negative" originalism, is introduced in Part IV.
A. JusticeKennedy's Progressivism-Relianceon ForeignSources of
Law to Divine an EmergingAwareness
Perhaps the most critical component of Justice Kennedy's progressive
analysis in Lawrence was his reliance upon foreign sources of law,
particularly decisional law from the European Court of Human Rights, to
inform his determination that there existed an emerging awareness in favor
of protecting private consensual homosexual conduct. Indeed, the very
concept of emerging awareness implies that a court will look beyond a
country's geographic borders to determine, as Justice Kennedy noted,
whether the "values we share with a wider civilization"5 evince a
predilection or tendency to protect a newly asserted, constitutionallycognizable right.
The critical inquiry, therefore, is whether reliance upon foreign sources
of law is a viable method by which to adjudicate domestic values based
constitutional controversies. An examination of this question reveals that
Justice Kennedy's reliance upon foreign sources of law raises several
concerns.

50. Id. at 576.
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1. Justice Kennedy's Reliance Upon Jurisprudence From the European
Court of Human Rights-Highlighting the Problems of Using Foreign
Sources of Law in Domestic Constitutional Disputes
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy relied upon decisions from the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) that prohibited the criminalization of
consensual homosexual sodomy. Specifically, in Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom,5 cited by Justice Kennedy in Lawrence, the ECHR held that
consensual homosexual conduct was a protected "privacy" right pursuant
to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.52 Significantly,
Justice Kennedy's reliance upon the ECHR (and other sources of foreign
law) was an important aspect of his progressivism, namely, his belief that
an emerging awareness of the "values we share with a wider civilization"
existed in favor of prohibiting the criminalization of consensual
homosexual conduct. 53 However, such reliance raises legitimate concerns
that courts must address when using foreign sources of law to support
domestic constitutional issues.
2. As a Human Rights Court, the ECHR Performs a Different
Institutional Role in Interpreting International Law
As an institutional matter, the ECHR is responsible for interpreting and
applying the European Convention on Human Rights, which is viewed as
an international treaty and not a domestic, organic text.54 This distinction
is significant because the ECHR's institutional role necessarily implicates
different considerations both as a matter of philosophy and of
interpretation as an arbitor of human rights, as opposed to domestic
constitutional disputes. Also, the ECHR is an international, rather than
domestic, court and its overriding purpose is to effectuate, and arguably
expand, the broad human rights guarantees of an international treaty. The
ECHR's institutional role, therefore, is both more specific and far broader
than that of a domestic constitutional court because its primary role is to
interpret and provide substantive meaning to a document (the Convention)
51. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
52. Id. § 52.
53. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560.
54. See Paul De Hert, Balancing Security and Liberty Within the European Human Rights
Framework.A CriticalReadingofthe Court'sCase Law in Light of SurveillanceandCriminalLaw
Enforcement StrategiesAfter 9/11, 1 UTREcHT L. REv. 68, 71 (2005) (stating that "the Convention
is not a Constitution but a Treaty. After ratification it does not automatically form part of the
domestic legal orders of a Member State.... Although the Court has referred to the Convention
as 'a constitutional instrument of European public order (ordrepublic),' it has accepted this treatylike status of the Convention.") (citation omitted), availableat http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/
publish/articles/000005/article.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
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whose provisions are unified by an overriding human rights objective.
Indeed, the specific objective of the ECHR's mission necessarily entails
the use of interpretive methods that differ vastly from a domestic
constitutional court, which often construes constitutional provisions that
are separate from, unrelated to, and not connected by an exclusive
substantive purpose. As a result, unlike a domestic constitutional court, the
ECHR's specifically defined institutional role creates a paramount value
upon which its jurisprudence develops.
Furthermore, the narrower nature of the ECHR's institutional purpose
is enhanced by the fact that, as an international court interpreting an
international treaty, it is not bound by the traditional temporal and
geographic limitations to which domestic constitutional courts are often
bound. For example, as expressed by Justice Scalia in Lawrence, a
domestic constitutional court may limit itself to analyzing the history,
customs, traditions, and practices of its country while eschewing the
consideration of sources from beyond its borders when interpreting a
nationalconstitution." The significance of this concept is that a domestic
constitutional court's jurisprudence is often constrained, resulting in
jurisprudence uniquely personal to its territorial jurisdiction. In this way,
the perspectives of a domestic constitutional court are likely to differ
substantially from those of an international human rights court because the
sources of decision-making are different. Stated simply, the legal
dynamics between the ECHR and domestic constitutional courts are quite
distinct because the ECHR has at its disposal a significantly broader array
of law, tradition, and custom upon which to inform its human rights based
jurisprudence. This fact is perhaps best underscored in the differing
interpretive methodology that the ECHR employs in values based
adjudication.
B. The ECHR 's Status as an InternationalHuman Rights Court, Which
Interprets an InternationalHuman Rights Treaty, Engenders an
InterpretiveMethodology Distinctfrom Those Employed by Many
Domestic ConstitutionalCourts
The concerns raised by incorporation of ECHR precedent in American
constitutional law are underscored by the fact that both courts employ
different interpretive methodologies. First, the ECHR interprets the
provisions of international treaties in accordance with internationallaw
principles." Indeed, in Golderv. UnitedKingdom,57 the ECHR stated that
55. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN BONAT, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
57. Golder v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 524 (1979-80).

RIGHTS 19-21

(2004).
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interpretation of the Convention's provisions would be guided by the
interpretive methods established at the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.58 The international character of the ECHR's
jurisprudence, therefore, only re-enforces the differing approaches to
constitutional
interpretation that the ECHR and U.S. Supreme Court
59
apply.
Of more consequence, however, is the dynamic or evolving method of
interpretation that the ECHR has increasingly employed in its
jurisprudence. Arising from Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention,
which states that the terms of a treaty should be interpreted in light of its
object and purpose,6 ° the ECHR has adopted a dynamic approach that
views the Convention as "a living instrument which . . . must be
interpreted in light of present-day conditions.",61 Indeed, the ECHR's
dynamic approach manifests itself through the "effectiveness principle,"
in which the ECHR stresses that the Convention "is intended to guarantee
'not rights that are theoretical or illusory but practical and effective' 62 :
Regarding the former, the Court will interpret the Convention's
provisions in order to make them 'practical and effective' in
servicing the broad objective it has adopted. Thus, if the treaty by
its plain language is not 'effectively' protecting a particular right,
the Court will see fit to make it so through expansive
interpretation.63
In essence, "the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for
the protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be
interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective

58. Id. at 532; see Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretationof Human Rights
Treatiesin the Recent Jurisprudenceof the European Court of Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L.
529, 533-38 (2003) (discussing relevant methods of treaty interpretation, including: (1) the plain
meaning as understood in light of the object and purpose of a treaty, (2) subsequent practice, (3)
relevant rules of international law, and (4) preparatory work).
59. This proposition is not without qualification, however, as the U.S. Supreme Court, in
certain contexts, i.e., Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, looks beyond its borders to evolving and
contemporary perspectives. For example, in its death penalty jurisprudence, the Court has
interpreted the Eighth Amendment, at least in part, based upon perspectives that have emerged in
the international context. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553-56 (2005).
60. E.g., Orakhelashvili, supranote 58, at 535.
61. BONAT, supra note 56, at 23.
62. De Hert, supranote 54, at 74 (quoting Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), § 24
(1979).
63. BONAT, supranote 56, at 21-22.
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... any interpretation must be consistent with ... the ideals and values of
a democratic society."
The Court's "living document" philosophy is also reflected in the
"consensus doctrine," a method by which the Court "finds an internal
European consensus, assumes this increase in rights was done in fealty to
the Convention, and then imposes this new standard on the straggling
state."65 For example, in Goodwin v. United Kingdom, '66 the ECHR
"looked outside of Europe and found an international'common ground'
granting full legal recognition of gender reassigned transsexuals .... ," In
accordance with its evolving method of interpretation, the ECHR stated
that "while there had not been a statistical increase in States giving full
legal recognition of gender re-assignment within Europe, information from
outsideEurope showed developments in [that] direction., 6 Thus, Goodwin
not only underscores the Court's expansive view of the Convention's
provisions, but "by reaching beyond Europe [it] explicitly connects the
Court's interpretation with evolving international human rights
standards., 69 Lastly, in certain areas, the ECHR's expansive jurisprudence
has resulted in the imposition of "positive obligations" upon Member
States, which is a requirement that a particular Member State undertake
measures to ensure the effectuation of a particular right.7"
Importantly, the ECHR's dynamic, "living document" philosophy has
resulted in very expansive decisions that most American courts,
particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, would be unlikely to countenance.
This proposition is evident in the ECHR's "privacy" jurisprudence,
particularly in the area of relational privacy, which arises under Article 8
of the convention.71 For example, in A.D. T v. UnitedKingdom,7 2the Court
64. Id. at 22 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A), § 87 (1989)).
65. See id. at 23.
66. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.
67. BONAT, supranote 56, at 24.
68. Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
70. See id. at 22.
71. Article 8 of the Convention For the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms provides that
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests ofnational security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
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held that the United Kingdom's "Sexual Offenses Act of 1967" violated
Article 8 because, although it decriminalized homosexual conduct, it
expressly prohibited such conduct where more than two individuals were
present. 3 Likewise, in Goodwin, the Court accorded full legal recognition
to transsexuals,74 and thereafter, in Van Kuck v. Germany,7 expanded the
rights of transsexuals, finding that the German courts violated Article 8 by
failing to define gender reassignment surgery as a necessary medical
treatment 76 and thus eligible for reimbursement by a private insurance
company. 7" Likewise, in the area of "zonal" or "territorial" privacy, the
Court, in Von Hannover v. Germany,7 8 held that Princess Carolina's right
to privacy under Article 8 was violated when she was photographed by
media officials while engaging in leisurely activities outside of her
residence. 79 Additionally, in Peck v. UnitedKingdom,8° the Court held that
a British citizen, who was located by police attempting to commit suicide
in a public place, suffered a violation of his privacy where a videotape of
the event was televised by national and local media outlets.8 '
The Court's dicta in its Article 8 jurisprudence further underscores the
expanding nature of privacy rights in Europe. For example, in Goodwin,
the Court stated that "serious interference with private life can arise where
the state of domestic law conflicts with an important aspect of personal
identity... [because] [t]he stress and alienation arising from a discordance
between the [person's] position in society... cannot.., be regarded as a
minor inconvenience...." 82 Likewise, in Van Kuck, the Court indicated
Vienna Convention art. 8. There exists a doctrinally rich body of law concerning the ECHR's
interpretation of Article 8, particularly with respect to those acts by Member States that are "in
accordance with law"; "necessary in a democratic society"; and "in the interests of... health or
morals." Such discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, except to highlight the expansive
interpretive method that the ECHR employs.
72. A.D.T. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35765/97, 2000-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.
73. Id. § 37.
74. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., § 90.
75. Van Kuck v. Germany, App. No. 35968/97, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., §§ 81-82, 85.
76. Id.
77. Id. These cases are but a sample of those that reflect the ECHR's expansive approach to
matters involving basic rights such as privacy. Indeed, the expansiveness of the ECHR's
jurisprudence, as compared to the U.S. Supreme Court, is reflected by the fact that the case relied
upon by Justice Kennedy in Lawrence, Dudgeon v. UnitedKingdom, was decided over twenty-five
years earlier.
78. Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 294.
79. Id.§§ 11, 13, 76-80.
80. Peck v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44647/98, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
81. Id. §§ 10, 86-87.
82. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95,2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., § 77 (emphasis
added). The court also held that "the very essence of the Convention [being] respect for human
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that the concept of private life is very broad and encompasses "an
individual's physical and social identity,... personal development, and
the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings
and the outside world."83 Additionally, in Von Hannover,the Court stated
that its notions of private life "ensure the development, without outside
interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with
other human beings [in the public domain]."84 The right to privacy,
moreover, "includes a social dimension,"85 that extends "into the 'public
context"' 86 and "may include activities of a professional or business
nature.8 7
The ECHR's privacy jurisprudence highlights both its differing
institutional role and jurisprudential focus from that of the U.S. Supreme
Court. First, its decisional law under Article 8 demonstrates that the ECHR
is committed to expanding the concept of privacy to the outer limits of
what can be deemed an "emerging awareness" of values that are shared by
a "wider civilization. 8 8 Its view of Article 8 is primarily forward-looking
and progressive. Its precedent places few, if any, strict limitations upon an
individual's right to private life.89 Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court's
approach informed by its responsibility to interpret a constitutional text,
reflects the fact that the U.S. Constitution both grants and restricts the
fundamental guarantees that it embodies. 90 Because these courts are
interpreting very different documents, which not only have different
purposes and objectives, but also derive from a different historical
dynamic, these courts serve different institutional roles. This notion is at
least partially responsible for the differing degrees of protection that
privacy engenders in the European Union as opposed to the United States.
Consequently, to the extent that judges such as Justice Kennedy rely upon
foreign law to support a domestic constitutional decision, they must
dignity and human freedom.., protection is given to... the right of transsexuals to personal
development and to physical and moral security .. ").
Id. § 90.
83. Van Kuck v. Germany, App. No. 35968/97, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., § 69.
84. Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., § 50 (emphasis
added).
85. Id. § 69.
86. Id. § 50.
87. Peck v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44647/98, 2003-1 Eur. Ct. H.R., § 57.
88. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572, 576-77 (2003).
89. See, e.g., Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., § 77;
Van Kuck v. Germany, App. No. 35968/97, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., § 69.
90. See generally Jacob Hornberger, Remembering the Constitution, THE FUTURE OF
FREEDOM FOUNDATION, Nov. 2001, http://www.ff.org/comment/ed 1l01h.asp.
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consider not only the judgments themselves but also the institutions and
doctrinal bases from which they emanate.
C. The ECHR is not as Committed to the Democratic
Premise of Majoritarianism
Another substantial difference is that the ECHR, particularly in the area
of "morals" legislation, is not nearly as deferential to European Member
States as is the U.S. Supreme Court to individual states. This is reflected
in the ECHR's tendency to de-emphasize the "margin of appreciation" 9 '
doctrine and, in some cases, impose positive obligations upon Member
States to ensure realization of a particular right. The margin of
appreciation is designed, in theory, to accord some measure of deference
to Member States' legislative enactments.92 As a practical matter, however,
particularly in morals or public welfare legislation, the ECHR has been
reticent to apply this doctrine consistently. For example, in Norris v.
93
the ECHR stated that "not only the nature of the aim of the
Ireland,
restriction but also the nature of the activities involved will affect the
scope of the margin of appreciation." 94 Thus, in cases implicating "a most
intimate aspect of private life ...

there must exist particularly serious

reasons before interferences on the part of public authorities can be
legitimate."95 In fact, in Lustig-PreanandBeckettv. UnitedKingdom,9 6the
ECHR held that serious reasons' 97exist only where the legislation at issue
"answers a pressing social need and is "proportionate" 98 to the asserted
objective. However, as Bonat states, "[t]here is no hard and fast rule on the
scope of the margin of appreciation .... It is a self-regulating doctrine for
the Court, and as the Convention evolves, less and less deference is
accorded to the parties." 99 Thus, the uneven (and uncertain) degree to
which its Court will apply the "margin of appreciation," coupled with the
application of "positive obligations" in some cases (discussed below),
substantially eviscerate any meaningful deference to Member States where
fundamental rights are implicated.'o
91. See, e.g., BONAT, supra note 56, at 25 (stating that, "as the Convention evolves, less and
less deference is accorded to the parties.").
92. Id.
93. Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
94. Id. § 46; Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), § 52 (1981).
95. Norris, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), § 46.
96. Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 548 (1999).
97. Id. § 80.
98. Id.
99. BONAT, supranote 56, at 25.
100. Id.; Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., § 57.
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Pursuant to the related (although distinct), doctrine of "positive
obligations," the ECHR has held that Article 8
does not merely compel the State to abstain from such [arbitrary]
interference [with privacy]... [T]here may be positive obligations
inherent in an effective respect for private or family life... [which]
may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect
for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals
between themselves.' 01
To be fair, however, pursuant to the doctrine of"subsidiarity," the Member
States "are primarily responsible for guaranteeing the rights and freedoms
of the Convention, so it falls to the State in question how it is to comply
with the Court's decision."'0 2
The ECHR's activist approach differs substantially from the deference
that American courts generally afford to state legislative enactments,
particularly in the context of morals. Again, this is due both to the
American constitutional structure and the legal framework adopted by
particular courts. For example, the U.S. Constitution creates a system of
enumerated powers that vests in individual states the primary legislative
authority in areas such as health, welfare, and public safety. °3 Of course,
while the debate continues regarding the degree of deference courts should
accord to legislatures' in a significant majority of cases involving values
or morality, courts ordinarily do not substitute their subjective policy
predilections for those of a particular state legislature.0 5 Conversely, while
recognizing this principle in theory, the ECHR's application of the margin
of appreciation, coupled with its imposition of positive obligations upon
Member States, suggest that it is, at least in certain areas, far more willing
to invalidate legislation that arguably furthers legitimate objectives, and
upon which reasonable minds could conceivably disagree.0 6 To be sure,
the ECHR's activist role represents a logical outgrowth of its dynamic

101. Von Hannover, App. No. 59320/00, § 57.
102. BONAT, supra note 56, at 14.
103. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X.
104. The debate over the proper degree of deference is often based upon each judge's
individual judicial philosophy, but the concept that state legislative enactments should not be
invalidated based upon a court's subjective policy predilections is firmly embedded in American
jurisprudence. It is a position noted by Justice Scalia in his Lawrence dissent. See Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. See Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208,214 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
106. See, e.g., BONAT, supra note 56, at 25; Von Hannover, App. No. 59320/00, § 57.
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interpretive method, which consistently strives to broaden the
Convention's human rights guarantees despite the absence of a European
consensus. °7 However, the ECHR's evolving judicial philosophy is
incompatible with the American principle that courts should not invalidate
legislation that serves as a core product of the democratic process,
federalism, and majority rule. 08 As one commentator has noted,
"European constitutional tradition contemplates 'a constitutional order
embodying universal principles that derive their authority from sources
outside nationaldemocraticprocesses and that constrain nationalselfgovernment.'""09
Ultimately, American courts and the ECHR afford states different
degrees of deference when reviewing values based legislation. For this
reason, instances will undoubtably arise where the ECHR would likely
reach different results in cases involving similar facts.110 This important
distinction counsels against relying too heavily upon foreign sources of
law, at least without due regard to the unique institutional nuances that
facilitate particular decision-making processes.

107. See BONAT, supranote 56, at 24 (discussing the Court's approach in Goodwin, where the
Court states as follows: "[tihe Court [ECHR] ... attaches less importance to the lack of evidence
of a common European approach... than to the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing
international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal
recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals").
108. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603-04 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
what Texas has chosen to do is well within the range of traditional democratic
action, and its hand should not be stayed through the invention of a brand new
"constitutional right" by a Court that is impatient of democratic change... it is
the premise of our system that those judgments are to be made by the people, and
not imposed by a governing caste that knows best.
Id. Of course, the structure of the European Union or, for that matter, the Member States, differs
from the U.S. federal structure, rendering a strict comparison based on principles of majority rule
and federalism somewhat dubious. However, substantial conceptual similarity exists between the
ECHR's and American courts' invalidations of laws respectively passed pursuant to the legislative
processes of Member States and individual U.S. states. In both instances, such laws are within the
states' traditional sphere of authority and often are the product of majority predilection.
109. Kenneth Anderson, ForeignLaw andthe US. Constitution:The Supreme Court'sGlobal
Aspirations, 131 POL'Y REV. (2005) (emphasis added), available at http://www.hoover.org/
publications/policyreview/2932196.html.
110. See, e.g., Goodwin v. United Kingdom, No. 28957/95, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., § 18. In
contrast to this ECHR decision, the American courts, at least in the current judicial climate, would
not recognize, much less require, a state legislature to recognize the rights of transsexuals.
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D. Foreign Sources of Law Are the Product of Unique Cultural,Social,
Economic, and PoliticalDynamics
Finally, foreign court decisions do not exist in isolation but are instead
responsive to the unique historical, cultural, social, and constitutional
traditions that influence a court's perspective. As law professor Kenneth
Anderson explains, unlike the United States, Western European
constitutionalism does not place emphasis upon the primacy of democratic
self-governance and national majoritarian prerogatives:
[F]ollowing the nationalist disasters of the interwar and Second
World War period, much of Western Europe's constitutionalism
was explicitly about reaching to any available source of
constitutionalism other than national democratic self-government,
which, equated with populism, was seen in no small part as a root
evil of war and social strife. It is a tradition deeply fearful of
democracy and above all hostile to the concept of popular
sovereignty. Indeed, in international constitutionalism,
"interpretation by a body of international jurists is, in principle, not
only satisfactory but superior to local interpretation, which
invariably involves constitutional law in partisan and ideological
political disputes."'I
Importantly, this approach differs dramatically from the American
perspective, which "regards constitutional law as the embodiment of a
particular nation's democratically self-given legal and political
commitments ....
antidemocratic ...

[American] constitutional law is emphatically not
[but] aims at democracy over time.""1.2 In this way,

"[t]hose who interpret its constitutional text owe their allegiance to... [a]
democratic, self-governing community."" 3
The difficulty, therefore, in relying upon foreign sources of law, as
Justice Kennedy did in Lawrence, is that one may not be sufficiently
mindful of the vastly different historical, cultural, and constitutional
perspectives that inform a particular decision. This problem is evident in
a comparison of Western European and American constitutionalism,
particularly the ECHR's jurisprudence, which starkly contrasts with its
dynamic framework from U.S. Supreme Courtjurisprudence. In the United
States, unlike in Western Europe, "[c]onstitutional interpretation is not
merely a matter of 'best policy,' considered in a vacuum, but 'best policy'
111. Anderson, supranote 109 (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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as it has arisen through democratic processes-which may or may not
have been successful in reaching the best policy.""' 4 In other words,
American constitutionalism represents "a vision of democratic
constitutional self-government founded on democracy and popular
sovereignty-everything that international constitutionalism and the
European tradition most rejects.""' 5
Thus, the problems of "comparative constitutionalism" suggest that
American courts should be hesitant to place substantial reliance upon
foreign court decisions in the domestic constitutional context. The
presence of widely divergent historical, political, and constitutional
traditions requires, at the very least, that judges comprehend the context
within which a foreign decision was rendered, a task that may itself be
impractical. Moreover, the sheer volume of foreign materials upon which
a court may elect to rely can create the appearance of self-serving
expedience or, far worse, render such reliance susceptible to claims of
arbitrariness. In addition, venturing outside of the domestic constitutional
context risks engendering the claim that a particular judge (or court) is
acting in an elitist manner that is intended to further a subjective policy
predilection not supported by domestic law and tradition. Such a claim
would be particularly troubling in the American constitutional structure
because its tradition explicitly emphasizes national democratic selfgovernment and respect for majority will.'16
Of course, this does not mean that foreign sources cannot operate to
support domestic decisions in some instances. 1 7 This Article does not
claim that foreign sources of law should never be used, but rather that its
use in values based adjudication should be done cautiously and with
particular sensitivity to the historical traditions of all nations involved.
Critically, this claim substantially undermines Justice Kennedy's
progressivism, because a substantial component of that approach is to rely
upon foreign sources of law to discern a rights based consensus.
These concerns ultimately do not necessarily mandate that Justice
Kennedy's progressivism be eliminated as a viable method to adjudicate
values based disputes because any constitutional approach will invariably
present problems of practical application. In fact, Justice Scalia's
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Coalition for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Owens, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1266 (D. Col.
2006) (citations omitted).
117. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). In Roper, the Court, per Justice Breyer
endorsed the use of foreign and international law in U.S. constitutional adjudication. Id. at 11982000; see also Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Permeabilityof ConstitutionalBorders, 82 TEX. L.
REv. 1763 (2004).
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originalism implicates separate, and perhaps more troubling, concerns that
render his approach to values based adjudication particularly dubious.
E.Justice Scalia 's Originalism-ProblemsWith Exclusive Reliance
Upon the American ConstitutionalTradition
In Lawrence, Justice Scalia eschewed the majority's reliance upon
foreign jurisprudence, dismissing it as "meaningless dicta" that sought to
"impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.""' 8 For Justice
Scalia, the only values, or rights, that are worthy of constitutional
protection are those that are "deeply rooted in this Nation 's history and
tradition."'' 9 To be sure, the asserted right must "be an interest
traditionally protected by our society"'12 and "so rooted in the . . .
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'' Furthermore,
Justice Scalia noted in Lawrence that, even if a right is designated as
fundamental, it is not immune from restriction should an individual state
proffer a compelling interest justifying its infringement.' 22 Moreover, all
other asserted liberty interests "may be abridged or abrogated pursuant to
state law if that law is rationally related to a legitimate
a validly enacted
123
state interest.'
Applying his originalist philosophy in Lawrence, Justice Scalia
surveyed the historical landscape, particularly state legislative enactments
and, rather than discerning an interest "traditionally protected by our
society, ' ' 22 he found that "our Nation has a longstanding history of laws
prohibiting sodomy in general ....,,125 Accordingly, Justice Scalia would
have upheld the State of Texas's prohibition upon consensual sodomy,
even though it was directed at same-sex couples, because the historical
tradition of prohibiting such conduct existed "regardless of whether it was
performed by same-sex or opposite-sex couples.' 2 6 It is therefore not
surprising that, for Justice Scalia, the use of foreign law in this context was
not only "meaningless dicta,' ' 127 but contrary to the requirement that
fundamental rights be rooted in domestic tradition and practice. Thus,

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

dissenting).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
Id. (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986).
Id. at 593 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989)).
Id.(quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993)).
Id.(citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593.
Id. (quoting MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 122).
Id.at 596.
Id.
Id. at 598.

A NEW METHOD TO GUIDE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

Justice Scalia's "originalist" philosophy in "values" based constitutional
adjudication places no confidence whatsoever in relying upon foreign
sources of law.' 28
However, the application of Justice Scalia's "originalism" in this
context is not without its conceptual and practical difficulties. First,
despite the ease with which Justice Scalia apparently discerns domestic
constitutional tradition relating to a particular issue, such an endeavor can
prove elusive and, in some cases, lead to inconsistent views on precisely
what this Nation's historical practice communicates. The domestic
historical record, whether it is law, custom, or practice, is not likely to
provide a straightforward answer to questions regarding the specific rights
that should be deemed fundamental. In fact, the record may be susceptible
to varying degrees of interpretation that depend more upon how the
inquiry is framed, rather than upon the existence of a traditional consensus.
Accordingly, reliance upon history and tradition is capable of the same
arbitrary and self-serving reliance that the use of foreign law potentially
risks.
In Lawrence, for example, Justice Kennedy disputed Justice Scalia's
view that there existed a "long standing history in this country of laws"
proscribing homosexual conduct.'29 Justice Scalia responded by asserting
that traditional practice prohibited sodomy in general,underscoring that
the method by which a court frames the relevant inquiry can have a direct
impact upon that court's interpretation of historical practice. 130 In any
event, the sheer volume of the historical traditions or practices of which
Justice Scalia speaks are not likely to provide straightforward guidance in
specific cases. 3 '
Second, and more fundamentally, application of the originalist
paradigm can result in unjust decisions that, based upon contemporary
perspectives, are inconsistent with modern notions of liberty, equality, and
fairness.' In fact, it can lead to harsh, even absurd, results. For example,
128. For further discussion of Justice Scalia's judicial philosophy, see John F. Manning,
JusticeScalia and the Legislative Process,62 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 33 (2006); see also Paul
Finkelman, Thomas Jefferson, OriginalIntent, and the Shaping of American Law: Learning
ConstitutionalLawfrom the Writing of Jefferson, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45 (2006).
129. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
130. Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 593-94, 598, 599, 603.
132. Of course, the debate concerning the implications of originalist philosophy, including the
results that it would create, is the subject of extensive commentary which is beyond the scope of
this Article. In addition, because originalist philosophy exists in numerous forms and is advocated
to varying degrees, there can be no certain conclusions regarding the results that its application
would create in particular forms. However, the criticism that the originalist perspective would
create unjust results is not without merit if, as Justice Scalia advocates, courts looked exclusively
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in an article discussing Cass Sunstein's "Radicals in Robes: Why RightWing Courts are Wrong For America," Stephen Pomper discusses the
implications of the originalist approach:
Sunstein's main objections to originalism don't have to do with its
theoretical vulnerabilities ....His principle objections are about
the results that it would produce .... If applied in its most literal
sense, the theory would force the courts to peel away decades of
constitutional law, and return the Constitution to the state it was in
prior to the New Deal.... A rigid application of originalism would,
for example, gut the case law on reproductive freedom ... on
relatively uncontroversial issues like the right of married persons to
buy birth control. And it would have a bizarre... impact on the law
in areas relating to race and religion.... And there's pretty much
no originalist support for the general idea that the Constitution
protects women from discrimination by Congress or by state
legislatures. . . . [O]riginalism tends to suggest that states can
actually establish their own religions .... Sunstein asks: Does
anybody really want to put on this ridiculous straightjacket?...
When confronted with the parade of horribles that originalism
might spawn
.... [i]t leaves us looking for another constitutional
33
approach.1
But what approach to constitutional interpretation can most effectively
bridge the divide between Justice Kennedy's progressivism and Justice
Scalia's originalism? This Article proposes a modest solution to this
problem by introducing the concept of "reverse" or "negative" originalism.
IV. INTRODUCING "REVERSE" ORIGINALISM-A PROGRESSIVE
JURISPRUDENCE THAT REMAINS FAITHFUL TO THE U.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL TRADITIONS

The significant divide between Justice Kennedy's progressivism and
Justice Scalia's originalism suggests that reliance upon evolving notions
to domestic practice when analyzing whether protection of a particular right is warranted. A
contrary result in Lawrence, for example, would have engendered precisely this criticism.
133. Stephen Pomper, Judging the Judges, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 2005, available at
http://www.washingtonmonthly.con/features/2005/0509.pomper.html (reviewing Cass Sunstein,
RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005)). In

Radicals in Robes, Sunstein advocates a "minimalist" approach to constitutional interpretation
which, broadly construed, "prefer[s] that the law be changed through narrow rulings and small
nudges rather than precedent-setting earthquakes."
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of fairness and liberty, based upon domestic and foreign perspectives,
cannot be reconciled with a court's duty to remain firmly committed to
domestic history and tradition. In fact, Justice Kennedy's reliance upon the
ECHR directly conflicts with Justice Scalia's belief that the only rights
worthy of protection34 are those that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's"
historical tradition.1
The more fundamental question, however, concerns the purposes
underlying Justice Kennedy's reliance upon foreign sources of law and his
position that "[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all
cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.' 35 It would
not be unduly speculative to assume that the Lawrence opinion reflected
a Supreme Court trying to achieve the "best policy," or the result that is
most consistent with evolving perspectives of equality, liberty and
fairness. Apart from the likelihood that such an approach will invite claims
of "elitism," judicial policymaking and arbitrariness, the Lawrence
majority was, at its core, trying to achieve a just and equitable result for a
group that has traditionally been underrepresented and unprotected in our
society. Whether the Court achieved that result is a matter for debate.
What is fairly uncontroversial is that progressivism, in its most basic
application, seeks to achieve the "right" outcome in a particular case, and
the use of foreign material is an important component of that search.' 36
This approach could not be in greater conflict with Justice Scalia's
"originalist" philosophy. Indeed, constitutional rights do not "spring into
existence" simply because an evolving consensus supports their
recognition. '3 On the contrary, policy change falls squarely within the
purview of democratic processes as reflected through majority rule and
subsequent legislative promulgation.' 38 Scalia dissents, therefore, the
Lawrence majority represented a circumvention of our constitutional
structure "through the invention of a brand-new 'constitutional right' by
a Court that is impatient of democratic change."' 39 In Justice Scalia's view,
American constitutionalism does not rely upon the "values we share with

134. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 193-94 (1986)).
135. Id. at 572 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 857 (1998)).
136. See generally Anderson, supranote 109 (emphasis added).
137. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Indeed, this is reflected by the judiciary's reticence, as a general matter, to substitute their
own policy predilections for those of a respective legislative body. See, e.g., Waterman v. Farmer,
183 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 1999).
139. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 603 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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a 'wider civilization,' 14 ° but instead finds expression through the values
and policy predilections that historical domestic tradition reveals.
To begin with, both Justice Kennedy's progressivism and Justice
Scalia's originalism have critically important components that are highly
relevant to, and are a valuable aspect of, American constitutionalism. As
a normative matter, judges should strive to achieve the "right"
result-results that are consonant with principles of fairness and equality,
particularly where evolving notions have demonstrated an existing practice
to be oppressive or unjust. The idea-that courts will endeavor to prohibit
state action that is inimical to basic due process guarantees-is neither
novel nor suspect in our domestic practice. In fact, the Supreme Court's
history is replete with precedent where the Court has invalidated longstanding practices that time has shown to be inconsistent with equal
treatment.' 4 ' Although, the line between proper judicial function and
undesirable judicial activism is often unclear, it cannot be said that a
court's scrupulous efforts to achieve the "right" outcome is per se
objectionable. Stated simply, progressivism and its desire to achieve
equitable outcomes should have a role in American constitutionalism.
On the other hand, a court that strives to achieve just outcomes through
substitution of its policy predilections cannot be said to be acting within
permissible boundaries. Thus, to the extent that a court affects the "right"
outcome at the expense of deference to a legislature's constitutional
authority, its decision should be exposed as intolerable judicial activism.
The venerable respect for the legislature's policymaking prerogative, both
as an institution and expression of democratic processes, is "deeply rooted
in this Nation shistory and traditions."' 4 2 Additionally, courts refer to and
rely upon our historical tradition when determining whether an asserted
right warrants constitutional protection. 43 Indeed, domestic tradition can
provide important insights regarding the intent, scope, and purposes which
underlie our most fundamental rights.
Moreover, knowledge of that history can inform a court's perspectives
regarding the degree to which a newly-asserted right has a cognizable
basis in the constitutional text. Reliance upon domestic tradition ensures
that our social, political, and cultural practices, as expressed through
140. Id. at 576 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
141. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches UsAbout ConstitutionalTheory, 90 VA.
L. REv. 1537 (2004) (discussing the impact of Brown v. Board of Education upon subsequent
constitutional jurisprudence).
142. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986)).
143. Id.at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997)).
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democratic processes and majority will, occupy a venerable place in
constitutional decision-making. Thus, when confronted with values based
adjudication, courts should be cognizant not only of their institutional
limitations, but also of the long-standing history that informs our very
notion of what it means to declare a newly-asserted "fundamental" right.
Put differently, the originalist position is an important aspect of American
constitutional law.
The critical problem, for which this Article proposes a modest solution,
is the failure to realize that both the progressive and originalist
philosophies can be integrated into a unified method of constitutional
interpretation. This Article posits that "negative" or "reverse" originalism
represents a plausible method by which to remain faithful to historical
tradition while simultaneously achieving outcomes that are consistent with
evolving notions of liberty. The concept of negative originalism is based
upon the assumption that domestic tradition should be a core aspect of
constitutional adjudication because such tradition reflects the unique
cultural, political, and social character of national constitutionalism.
However, negative originalism presupposes that the concept of "rights,"
particularly those worthy of constitutional protection, should not remain
stagnant or fixed in history. Rather, rights-recognition should be
responsive to the evolving perspectives of liberty that human experience
generates.
Based upon these assumptions, the theory of negative originalism
would require a court not to divine the precise meaning of broadly worded
constitutional phrases or of long-standing historical practice. Such an
endeavor would likely entail distinct interpretive difficulties, be subject to
contrary conclusions, and risk arbitrary and self-serving utilization. In
some cases, moreover, the historical record will be invariably unclear and
susceptible to varying interpretations, thus proving inadequate for
constitutional decision-making processes. Furthermore, to the extent that
domestic practice can answer modem questions of rights-protection, the
result may be highly unjust or inequitable.
Negative originalism would require a court to ascertain whether
protection of a newly-asserted right would be contrary to, inconsistent
with, or discountenancedby the salutaryvalues that our domestic tradition
embraces. Negative originalism would therefore require a court to discern
the generalor overridingprinciples that underlie a particular constitutional
provision such as the Due Process Clause, or a particular historical practice
such as race-related legislation, and examine whether the newly-asserted
right would contravene the general intent that has manifested itself
through evolution of domestic law. In this way, negative originalism
would still require a court, particularly in values based cases, to conduct
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a searching examination of the historical record, as expressed through
constitutional and legislative history, to ensure that newly-recognized
rights are supported by domestic tradition and not the result of judicial
policy predilection. In other words, the broad values that our country has
deemed sacrosanct, through democratic process and majoritarian rule,
warrant special recognition as expressions of our most deeply-held notions
of liberty. Moreover, an integral aspect of that recognition must be rooted
in judicial decision-making that strives to continue the evolution in rightsrecognition that this country has unquestionably undergone, yet in a
manner that is consistent with the broad values underlying that evolution
rather than subjective policy preferences.
Critically, the requirement that courts ascertain only the broadvalues
or general intent upon which domestic tradition is based reflects the
principle that concepts of liberty, fairness, and equality evolve over the
course of time and through the trials of human experience. Indeed, whether
it is the experience of the United States or foreign nations, concepts of
rights protection are undoubtedly informed by human events, cultural
evolution, and social awareness. For example, evolving notions of
discriminatory treatment have resulted in increasing protection for
traditionally disadvantaged groups, such as women, minorities, and
homosexuals, through legislative action and policy reform.'" Furthermore,
evolutions in the very principles that have formed our national
constitutionalism have resulted in a society that is more fair, equal, and
free. Indeed, the judiciary has played a vital role in eradicating, through
landmark decisions, various oppressive practices that evolving concepts
would likely not tolerate.'45 Stated simply, negative originalism recognizes
that values based adjudication must allow for the benefits that modem
notions of liberty and fairness will provide.
In addition, negative originalism reflects the fact that, in modem
jurisprudence, difficult issues invariably arise that could neither have been
contemplated by the drafters of our Constitution and early legislation nor
resolved by reference to historical tradition. The broad text of the
Constitution's provisions, such as the Equal Protection Clause, arguably
serve as a testament to this notion. However, while various contemporary
values disputes could not have been anticipated or foreseen, the
Constitution does set forth broad provisions concerning liberty that can

144. See id. at 572-74 (noting that the failure of states to enforce anti-sodomy laws
underscores that such laws are inconsistent with the conception of rights that is emerging both
domestically and abroad).
145. See, e.g., id.; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553-56 (2005).
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inform resolution of these disputes.'" It is precisely for this reason that the
broad guarantees upon which, for example, the Due Process Clause is
based are relevant to answering the questions posed in values based
adjudication. As such, negative originalism contemplates an active role for
courts in discerning whether recognition of a newly-asserted right would
contravene the salutary principles that influenced the evolution of
domestic tradition and practice. Importantly, while negative originalism
requires courts to only discern the general intent underlying a given
constitutional provision or historical tradition, such inquiry should be
neither confining nor superficial. For example, courts should focus upon
the relevant circumstances, context, and expectations which lead to the
historical evolution of liberty interests to determine whether expansion of
this interest warrants recognition of a newly-asserted right.
Of course, this proposition begs the question whether, and to what
extent, foreign sources of law should factor into a court's analysis. As a
preliminary matter, negative originalism would allow the use of foreign
sources of law, but only to the extent that such sources are neither
inconsistent with nor contrary to the domestic evolution of a particular
constitutionalvalue. In other words, foreign sources of law should not be
used to justify a court's subjective policy judgment or unilateral desire to
"draw American constitutional norms into 'ever closer union'.., with
those of the rest of the world."' 47
Foreign sources of law should not be used to globalize the Supreme
Court at the expense of our unique domestic tradition; they should be used
to confirm that an expansion of our domestic practice to recognize a newly
asserted right is supported by a national evolution that justifies
incorporationwith internationalconsensus. Otherwise, the use of foreign
materials will be susceptible to claims of arbitrariness, elitism, and the
desire by courts to substitute their policy predilections for those expressed
through the democratic process.148 The use of foreign materials in such a
manner would be troubling because it would undermine the values of our
national constitutionalism and slowly remove constitutional decisionmaking from the historical tradition upon which it rests.
These sentiments only serve as a brief introduction to negative
originalism because its application will certainly engender practical
146. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (setting forth the broad proposition that no State shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
147. Anderson, supra note 109.
148. This would be contrary to the courts' long-standing policy of not substituting their policy
preferences for those of a particular legislative body, as expressed in statutory law. See Waterman
v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 1999).
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difficulties. For instance, it can be argued that ascertaining merely the
general intent underlying historical concepts of liberty will allow courts
to utilize undefined platitudes that are nowhere justified in domestic
tradition to unilaterally recognize new constitutional rights. The concept
of "liberty," for example, can mean whatever a court holds and can result
in precisely the type ofjudicial policymaking that lies within the province
of legislative action. In addition, with a modest amount of creative
interpretation, courts will be able to selectively cite to domestic and
foreign sources and justify whatever "rights expansion" they deem
desirable. Similarly, while it may be possible to discern the general intent
underlying specific constitutional provisions, such intent can never justify
progressive jurisprudence that the Constitution's drafters failed to
contemplate.
These concerns are valid and merit significant debate. The problem,
however, is that the same arguments can be advanced against Justice
Scalia's originalism, Justice Kennedy's progressivism, or any interpretive
paradigm that vests judges with substantial discretion. Negative
originalism attempts to channel that discretion in such a manner that gives
domestic practice primacy in constitutional decision-making, yet allows
courts to recognize that history has limits concerning the situations to
which it can be applied.
The presence of a modem consensus that results from collective human
experience does not mean that a progressive jurisprudence undermines
domestic tradition. Moreover, by requiring courts to ensure that expansive
rights-protection, based upon contemporary perspectives, does not
undermine or offend our domestic tradition, negative originalism strives
to ensure that courts exercise extreme care in recognizing newly asserted
rights. Courts must be sensitive to the historical record and responsive to
evolving notions of justice to provide meaningful contemporary
understandings of the Constitution's most basic guarantees.
Ultimately, courts should be circumspect to recognize "new" rights and
even more careful to place undue reliance upon foreign sources of law. If
there exists uncertainty or conflict in domestic practice, then progressive
change is best left to the democratic process. However, the "emerging
awareness"' 49 reflected in values based adjudication warrants application
not
of the principle that "[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but
' 15 °
in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.

149. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
150. Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)).

